A patent confers a monopoly and the longer the patent lasts, the greater the monopoly. Limiting the duration of a patent, with the exception of the Constitution, see U.S. Const. Art. I, number eight, par. 8; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146, 109 S.Ct. 971, 103 L.Ed.2d 118 (1989), and necessary to avoid impossible persecution problems (imagine if a caveman had obtained a perpetual patent on the wheel) serves to limit the monopoly power conferred on the patent holder. But, as we have already said, the collection of royalties beyond the duration of the patent does not extend the monopoly of the patent holder; it simply changes the date of payment of royalties. This would be evident if the licensing agreement between Scheiber and Dolby came into effect one month before the last patent expired. The parties could have agreed that Dolby would pay royalties for the next 100 years, but it is clear that the royalty rate would be very small due to the impending expiry of the patent.
Brulotte mentioned the renewal of the licence requirement over the duration of the patent to be bind by analogy, 379 U.S. to 33, 85 S.C. 176, because the traditional objection to the undertaking, as we have found, is that, in telling the buyer that he cannot purchase the bond product, unless he agrees to buy a separate product from the seller, it is only in the product area instead of increasing over time. However, if the seller attempts to impose a monopoly price for this separate product, the buyer is not willing to pay as much for the binding product as he would if the separate product he must also purchase was charged at a lower price. The acquisition of monopoly power in the related products market comes at the expense of the loss in the binding products market. Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1202-03 (3d Cir.1995); Hirsh v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343, 1349 n. 19 (9 cir.1982).
As these cases and a tidal wave of legal and economic scholarship show, the idea is that one can use the link to bring a second (or, in the termination of patent taxes after expiry, a longer and therefore greater monopoly), an economic nonsense attributing to businessmen a systematic irrationality. Congress seems to have recognized this in the 1988 amendment. Therefore, even if the amendment were to be interpreted to reject the justification for the binder cases, and although Brulotte`s justification is materially identical to that of discredited undertaking cases, the Court even invoked “leverage” (as he later pointed out to Aronson) and stated that it was an extension of the patent to “use this leverage [of monopoly power] to project these royalty payments beyond the duration patent life. 379 U.S.